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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
IDA LONG and IDA Long,
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF HARRY W. LONG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
GLENN McKENSIE, JOHN
HULICK, MUTUAL OF
OMAHA INSURANCE
COMPANY, Life Insurance
affiliate of United of Omaha;
UNITED BENEFIT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

12844

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendants and Respondents disagree with the
nature of the case, as set forth in Appellant's Brief.
Respondents contend that the case involved an action
filed to recover on an Application for Life Insurance.
The Defendants and Respondents made a Motion for a Directed Verdict after having rested at the
close of the Defendants' evidence, which Motion the
Court took under advisement and reserved its ruling
thereon until after special verdicts were returned by
1

the Jury. The Court thereafter granted Defendants'
and Respondents' Motion for a Directed Verdict.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., District Judge, granted
Defendants' and Respondents' Motion for a Directed
Verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants and Respondents disagree substantially with the Statement of Facts as set forth by
Plaintiff and therefore desire to make their own
statement of facts.
On June 16, 1970, the Defendants, Glenn McKensie and John Hulick, Agents for the Defendant
Life Insurance Company, went to the home of Harry
W. Long, in response to a post card mailed by Mr.
Long in which he invited them to discuss the possibility of writing insurance for him. Mr. Long explained the kind of insurance he wished to apply for
and an Application was completed by Glenn McKensie in response to questions on the Application. The
actual Application is Exhibit No. 25 D. Mr. Long
gave the agents a check for $13.88, together with a
post-dated check, dated July 10, 1970, also for $13.88,
which were tendered as the first premium. The
agents, McKensie and Hulick denied that a receipt
was given, because under the Company's rules on a
Bank Service Plan, which Mr. Long requested (Exhibit 6-7P), two full months' premiums were required to be tendered with the Application.
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Exhibit 20 D, which is a copy of the Regulations,
states:
"A full premium must be collected at the
time the Application is taken."
Full premium means annual, semi-annual, quarterly,
or in the case of the Bank Service Plan, "two B.S.P.
premiums - nothing less."
Because of the post-dated check, two full payments had not been paid. The next day, the Application was turned into William B. Toohey Agency, general agents for the Defendants, insurance company
in Salt Lake City, Utah. On June 20, 1970, the Toohey Agency forwarded the Aplication to the home
office in Omaha, Nebraska. The regular insurance
investigation was made at the request of the home
office by the local office of American Service Bureau,
an investigating firm. On June 30, 1970, the Defendant, insurance company, rejected the Application
and a Notice of Terminated Application issued as of
that date. No policy of insurance was written. Exhibit 11 D, which is the Notice of Terminated Application, was date stamped in the Salt Lake Office of
the William B. Toohey Agency on July 2, 1970 and
' 1 stated that the premium collected at the time of solicitation was to be returned at once.
The next day, July 3, 1970 was a Friday, and
part of the official long Fourth of July weekend and
William B. Toohey Agency was closed as it was on
Saturday, July 4th and Sunday, July 5th. On Mon3

day, July 6th, the Toohey Agency received a call from i
McDougal's Funeral Home and the notice of the
death of Mr. Long appeared in the paper, advising
of Mr. Long's death on July 3rd.
1
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On July 6th, which was the first business day ;
following the long Fourth of July weekend, the so- ·
Heiting agents, Hulick and McKensie, tendered the
refund check, together with the post-dated check to,
Mrs. Long, which she refused.
On Tuesday, July 7, 1970, the refund check and
the post-dated check were mailed to Mrs. Long, with I
a return receipt requested and was received by her
on July 8, 1970.
The soliciting agents, Hulick and McKensie, first
saw the rejection notice on July 6, 1970, (T. 140-159)
and learned of the death of Mr. Long no the same day.
Both agents testified that they told Mr. Long that
he would be covered for insurance upon acceptance
of the Application by the Company. (T. 101 - T. 169).
At the close of the Defendants' evidence, Defen- ·
dants made a Motion for a Directed Verdict and the .
Court reserved its ruling on the Motion for a Direct- '
ed Verdict until after the jury had returned Answers
to special questions as follows:
"We the Jury find on a preponderance of
the evidence in this case, the following answers
to questions propounded to us:
1. Glenn McKensie or John Hulick ex· )
ecuted and delivered to Harry W. Long, upon
delivery to them of premium checks, the re·
1
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which had been attached to the Application for Insurance to the United Benefit Life
Insurance Company.
Answer: Yes.
2. Glenn Mc Kensie or John Hulick told
Harry W. Long at the time he completed and
signed the Application for insurance with the
Defendant, that he was insured from that time
and until the Application was thereafter accepted or denied by the Company.
Answer: Yes.
3. The Defendant, United Benefit Life
Insurance Company rejected the Application
for insurance by Harry W. Long and sent the
Notice of Termination or rejection on the Application to its Salt Lake General Agent, the
W. B. Toohey Agency, prior to the death of
Harry W. Long.
Answer: X.
Subsequently, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict previously made.
POINT NO. I

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL COURT
WAS CORRECT IN SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT,
BECAUSE THE APPLICATION MADE IT
CLEAR THAT THE INSURERS' OBIGATION
WAS CONDITIONAL UPON ACCEPTANCE BY
THE COMPANY.

POINT NO II

THE APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE WAS
MERELY AN OFFER FOR A CONTRACT OF
INSURANCE, WHICH OFFER WAS UNCON5

DITIONALLY REJECTED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME BY THE DEFENDANT COMPANY PRIOR TO MR. LONG'S DEATH, AND
NO INSURANCE CONTRACT EVER CAME
INTO BEING.

ARGUMENT

POINT NO. I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL COURT
WAS CORRECT IN SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT,
BECAUSE THE APPLICATION MADE IT
CLEAR THAT THE INSURERS' OBIGATION
WAS CONDITIONAL UPON ACCEPTANCE BY
THE COMPANY.

This case is governed by the case of Winger vs.
Gem State Mutual, 22 U.2nd 132, 449 P.2d 982, ·
where insurance coverage was declined before fatal
injuries and no insurance contract came into being
despite the agent's inability to communicate the in·
surer's rejection prior to the fatal injuries.

In the first interrogatory submitted to the Jury, ,
as to whether or not the Agents gave a receipt, the :
Jury found that they had, despite the fact that none '
was introduced. It is Defendants' and Respondents' •
position that as a matter of law, it makes no differ· !
ence whether one was given or not, because the Ian· i
guage in the Receipt, (Exhibit 24 D). was almost
identical to the language of the Receipt in the Winger
case, where it was admitted that even though a re·
ceipt was given, the clear wording of the Receipt
made it conditional upon finding the Applicant in· ·
surable under its usual rules.

1
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The face of the Receipt (Exhibit 24 D), even
if one had been given, would have acknowledged the
receipt of the money for the full first premium and
provided,
"'The insurance applied for shall be effective on the date of application or the date of
any medical examination required by the Company, whichever is the later, subject to the requirements stated on the reverse side of this
receipt.
"If the application is not approved, full
refund of premium will be made on surrender
of this receipt. If you are not advised regarding the application within 60 days, please notify the Company at its Home Office in Omaha,
Nebraska."
The conditions on the reverse side of the Receipt
(Exhibit 24 D) , provide:
"Requirements for Insurance to Become
Effective."
"Insurance will be effective as stated in
this receipt provided that:
1. The proposed insured and, if Family Plan
Insurance is being applied for, each of the
family members named in the applica:tion
is determined by the Company at the
Home Office in Omaha, Nebraska, to be
insurable, in accordance with its usual
rules and practices, on the basis and for
the policy applied for, effective on the
date of application or the date of any medical examination required by the Company, whichever is the later;
7

2. The full first premium is paid in cash on
the date of application;
3. The policy is issued exactly as applied for
within 60 days from the date of application;
4. The total life insurance in force with the
Company on the proposed insured, including the amount now applied for, will not
exceed $125,000."
This is practically identical to the language of
the receipt which was admittedly given in the Winger case, supra, wherein the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Tuckett, stated at Pages 982-983:
'''Conditional Receipt.' The face of the
receipt acknowledged receipt of the money
amounting to two months' premium and also
included language 'subject to conditions on reverse side.' The conditions on the reverse side
of the receipt form provide in part as follows:
The affective date of the policy will be the
later of: date of application, or date of medical
examination, if required, provided that the 1.
Proposed insured is determined by the C<J?Yi·
pany at its Business Office in accordance unth
its rules and practices, to be insurable on such
date for the policy exactly as applied for; 2.
Full first premium is paid in cash on daw of
application; 3. Policy is issued axactly as ap·
plied for within thirty days from this date;***
No medical examination was required in the
case of Winger."
As in the Winger case, no examination was re·
quired of Mr. Long.
As to the finding in the second interrogatory,
8

I

I
,
1

1

i

!
I

·

1

,
1

I
!
'

I
1

!
1

I

'

the fact that the jury found that the agents told Mr.
Long that upon signing the Application, he was insured until the Application was accepted or den'ied,
still is not governing.
Assuming the facts as found by the jury to be
correct, the Company still had a right to accept or reject the Application, because of the express language
contained in the Application as set forth above.
Again, in the Winger case, it was admitted that
the agent told Winger that he was covered. The Court
held that the agent did not have authority to bind the
Company finally in a contract of insurance, and that
no contract of insurance had come into being.
The Application states, in paragraph 1:
"The Company is not bound by any statements made by or to any agent, unless such
statements are written in this Application."
With respect to Interrogatory No. 3, it is Defendants' and Respondents' position that the only effect
this has is that the evidence to the Jury's mind, did
not preponderate on the issue as to whether or not the
rejection notice was received by the Toohey Agency
prior to Mr. Long's death. The rejection notice, with
the date stamped by the Toohey Agency, as of July
2, 1970, under the evidence, stands unchallenged and
uncontroverted by the Appellant. There is not one
shred of evidence that the rejection notice was not
mailed out on the date it bears and received by the
Toohey Agency on the date which shows on its face.
9

Both Hulick and McKensie saw it on the next busi.
ness day following the date it was stamped in.

!
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It is Defendants' and Respondents' position that,
even assuming that the notice was not received in the'
Toohey agency, it would be immaterial to the result,!
because the date of the rejection notice is uncontroverted.

1
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Considering the days over the long 4th of July•
weekend that the office of the Toohey agency was i
closed for mail, the rejection notice had to have been ;
mailed out of Omaha on the 30th day of June and re·
ceived in Salt Lake on July 2nd. Hulick and McKensie
who both had a financial interest in the policy being
issued, saw the rejection notice on Monday, July 6th.
1
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POINT NO. II
THE APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE WAS
MERELY AN OF'FER FOR A CONTRACT OF
INSURANCE, WHICH OFFER WAS UNCONDITIONALLY REJECTED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME BY THE DEFENDANT COMP ANY PRIOR TO MR. LONG'S DEATH, AND
NO INSURANCE CONTRACT EVER CAME
INTO BEING.

A contract of insurance is governed by the same :
rules as governs the formation of any contract. There!
must be an offer, and an acceptance or meeting of the
minds, as is essential to the formation of any contract.
43 Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. 203, at page 259 states:
"A contract of insurance must be assented to by both parties either in person or by
10
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their agents. There must be a meeting of the
minds of the parties on the essential terms and
elements of the contract."
The Application, itself, was not a contract, but
was a mere offer, a proposal for a contract of insurance. It is merely a step in the creation of an insurance contract. 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 208, page 265
states:
"In the ordinary effectuation of a policy
of insurance, negotiations therefor are initiated by an application by the person seeking such
insurance. The application itself is not the contract, but is a mere offer or proposal for a contract of insurance. It is merely a step in the
creation of the insurance contract. Before the
contract of insurance is effected and any contractual relationship exists between the parties
it is necessary that the application be accepted
by the insurer, since it is well settled that insurance companies are not compelled to accept
every application presented and may stipulate
upon what terms and for what period of time
the risk will be accepted.
uThe application may be withdrawn at
any time before it is definitely accepted by the
insurance company, even though at the time of
making the application the applicant pays or
gives a note for the payment of the premium."
43 Am. Jur. 2nd, Section 210, page 267 states:
"Until the application is accepted, no contractual relationship exists between an aplican t for insurance and the insurance company.
The acceptance of the application or proposal
11

insurance is necessary to make the policy of
msurance founded thereon binding and effec.
tive, especially where by the terms of the application its approval is required before the
risk shall attach.
"As a general rule and apart from ex·
press stipulations to a contrary effect, a contract of insurance is consummated by and not
until the unconditional acceptance of the application or proposal for such insurance, and
this is the rule even though the aplication or
proposal is accompanied by the payment of the
premium. The acceptance must be in the life.
time of the applicant. If the death of the appli·
cant intervenes, no contract is effected."
In this case the application was rejected prior
to the death of the aplicant.
Paragraph 3 of the Application (Exhibit 25 D)
specifically states in part, immediately above the sig·
nature of the applicant:
"The Company shall have no liability un·
til the policy is issued, delivered and accepted."
The Company is entitled to accept or reject the
risks which it will insure, even arbitrarily. 43 Am.
Jur. 2nd, Section 213, page 269 states:
"As a general rule, and since a contract
of insurance rests upon the assent of the par·
ties, an insurance company is not bound to ac·
cept an application or proposal for
but may reject it for any reason or arb1trar·
ily."
An insurance company cannot be forced even
12

by statute to accept all applications and in effect
thereby to be required to waive its right to select risks.
43 Am. Jur. 2nd., Sec. 213, page 270.
In this case on the next business day after receipt of the notice of termination, the applicant's
family was notified of the rejection.
The Court, in the Winger case, supra, at page
983, clearly stated the law governing this case as follows:
"It is clear from the wording of the receipt that the obligation of the defendant was
conditional upon its determinati-On that the applicant was insurable according to its rules
and practices. The defendant having made its
determination that Winger was not insurable
and having elected to decline his a'PPlicati-On,
we are constrained to the view that no contract
of insurance existed in favor of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff cites the case of Price v. Western
Empire Life Insurance Company recently decided by this court, but it appears to us that
that case is distinguishable upon the ground
that in that case the insurer did not decline
coverage prior to the time of the fatal injuries
being suffered by the applicant, but that it was
seeking further medical informati-On for the
purpose of determining the premium to be
charged." (Emphasis ours).
Appellant, in her Brief at page 12, cites, in addition to the case of Price v. Western Empire Insurance Company, supra, which the Court distinguished
from Winger vs. Gem State Mutual of Utah, as above
set forth, the further authority of Moore vs. Pruden13

tial Insurance Company of America, 491 P.2d 227, I
25 U. 2nd 493.
(
The Moore case, supra, is distinguishable from
the instant case, because under the facts of the Moore
case, the Company approved the application and a
policy isued prior to the death of the insured. As has
been pointed out in the case before the Court, the Ap.
plication was rejected prior to the death of the appJi.
cant, and no policy of insurance issued.
The recently decided Utah case, Fabrizio vs.
Fidelity and Guaranty Life Insurance, 494 P.2d
is consistant with the holding of the Winger cruie,
supra.
There are a number of statements in Appellant's
Brief, which in the opinion of the Respondent, are
both contrary to the facts and the law. The Respon·
dent will not answer each statement and contention
with which it disagrees, but is willing to submit the
matter to the Court. One such misstatement ,is the
statement on page 8: "The jury conclusively found 1
that the company rejected application after death."
Presumably, Appellant is referring to Interrogatory
N 0 • 3, which simply asked if the Defendant Company I
sent the notice of termination or rejection to its Salt
Lake General Agent, and the notice was received by•
the W. B. Toohey Agency, prior to the death of Harry!
W. Long. The jury's answer was "X," simply mean·
ing that the proof did not preponderate with respect
to the time when the notice was received by the Too14

hey Agency (Jury Instruction 14 R. 98). As has
been pointed out in this Brief, ff in fact the application was rejected prior to the applicant's death, the
fact that the notice was not received until after his
death, is not material, because of the requirement of
an affirmative acceptance.
Another such statement is that on page 9, where
it is represented that the Defendant ''was plently willing to insure Harry W. Long, take his money and his
payment plan, and oblige him to pay premiums for
the rest of his natural life." It is elementary that an
insured is obligated for the remainder of his life, only
if he wishes to keep the insurance in force and can
terminate it at any time.
CONCLUSION
The law is well established in Utah that if the
insurance company declines to accept coverage under
an application, within a reasonable time prior to the
time o'f the fatal injury, no contract of insurance
comes squarely under this rule of law and the trial
court was correct in sustaining the Motion for a Directed Verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES E. FAUST
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
A:ttorney for Defend.ants
and Respondents
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